Robin Cook on prospects for Lockerbie trial

[What follows is the text of a report published on this date in 1998 in The Sunday Times, as reproduced on Safia Aoude’s The Pan Am 103 Crash Website:]

The foreign secretary, Robin Cook, believes it is increasingly likely that the two Libyans suspected of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing will be turned over to a court in the Hague by Christmas, ending a 10-year wait to bring them to justice.

"I'm encouraged that the Libyans are seriously engaged on our proposal," Cook said in an interview last week. "There has been no grandstanding or wasting of time."

Cook said indications from Libya suggested that Muammar Gadaffi wanted to break the deadlock over the fate of the two men, Abdel Baset Ali al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah. They are accused of placing a suitcase bomb aboard the Pan Am 103 jet that blew up over the Scottish town of Lockerbie on December 21 1988, killing all 259 people aboard and 11 on the ground.

The foreign secretary said he was particularly encouraged by the recent appointment of a senior Libyan team of lawyers, headed by Kamel al-Maghour, a former foreign minister, to represent the pair.

British sources said they had been told by the United Nations that the Libyans were "largely happy" with assurances given by the British government three weeks ago concerning the planned conduct of legal proceedings.

This followed an Anglo-American proposal made in August under which the two would be tried in the Hague under Scottish law before a panel of Scottish judges and not in London or Washington.

Among the assurances, Britain has guaranteed Libya that the offer of a trial in the Netherlands is not merely a ruse to get hold of the men and send them to America or Britain. The families of the accused have been promised access to them and the defence team allowed to call witnesses from Britain.

The government has also tried to assuage Gadaffi's fears that senior Libyan officials called to testify might be arrested. "Anyone who comes and gives evidence ... is immune from arrest for offences in the past," Cook said. He also insisted the West would honour its pledge to end sanctions imposed on Libya immediately the suspects were handed over. [RB: It is important to note that what was being accorded to witnesses was immunity from arrest while at Zeist. Witnesses receive immunity from prosecution only if called by the Crown as accomplices of those on trial to give evidence against them. Ordinary prosecution witnesses receive no immunity from prosecution, but are entitled to refuse to answer questions that might incriminate them.]

First indications of how quickly the men may be handed over could emerge after the Libyan legal team meets Hans Correll, the Swedish diplomat who is the United Nations' top legal officer, in New York tomorrow.

The only remaining key sticking point is the Libyan demand that al-Megrahi and Fhimah should be imprisoned in the Netherlands rather than Britain if convicted. Cook says this remains non-negotiable. "If convicted of offences under Scottish jurisdiction, they will serve time in a Scottish prison," he said. "There are two cells in Barlinnie [prison] prepared." Cook has made bringing the Libyans to justice a priority since taking office in May last year.

On his desk in the Foreign Office is a constant reminder of the tragedy: a glass globe Cook calls the "Lockerbie snow ball", which was sent by the relative of an American victim. When it is turned upside down, snows falls on miniature Lockerbie memorials.

The late Robin Cook

On this date in 2005 the death of Robin Cook was announced. As Foreign Secretary in the Labour Government formed after the general election held on 1 May 1997, he played a significant part in overcoming the UK and US intransigence that was preventing a neutral venue Lockerbie trial. According to the report in The Independent:

As Foreign Secretary in Labour's first term, he sought to implement a more ethical approach to Britain's relations with the rest of the world. Mr Cook himself had listed his proudest achievements in Government as: "Breaking the deadlock in the Lockerbie case; defending Kosovo; saving lives and relieving suffering in Sierra Leone; contributing to the fall of Milosevic; transforming Britain's relations with Europe; rebuilding respect for Britain in the world."

Items on this blog referring to Robin Cook can be found here.

Approaching the end game

[What follows is the text of a report dated 14 February 1999 on the ITN Source website:]

British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has said that efforts to bring to trial two Libyan suspects in the 1988 airliner bombing over the Scottish town of Lockerbie "could be approaching the end game".

Britain, the United States and Libya are nearer than ever to an accord on trying two Libyan suspects in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 but looseremain, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said on Sunday (February 14).

"What we now need is to tie down the general agreement to the principle of a trial in the Netherlands, with a very clear specific undertaking from (Libyan leader) Colonel (Muammar) Gaddafi," Cook told reporters.

"What we want to see is justice carried out in a fair and open trial.We now look as if we are closer to that than we have ever been so far," he said during a break in diplomatic efforts to broker a peace in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

South Africa said on Saturday that envoys from Pretoria and Saudi Arabia, who had been in talks this week with Gaddafi, had reached agreement over trying the men accused of the bombing of the Pan American jetliner over the Scottish town of Lockerbie.

A total of 270 people, mostly Americans, were killed when the plane blew up and crashed.

Cook, speaking to reporters from the steps of the chateau in Rambouillet outside Paris where the Kosovo talks are taking place, said he would talk to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan about the agreement later in the day.

Libya has been under UN sanctions since 1992 over its refusal to surrender the two suspects in the bombing, Abdel Basset Ali Mohammed al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah.

"I'm not going to sigh with relief until the two men touch down in the Netherlands.But I am encouraged at the progress that has been made.After months of very hard progress, it looks as if we could be approaching the end game," Cook said.

Cook said on Saturday that Britain and the United States would not compromise on insisting that the suspects serve any sentence in a Scottish prison if they were found guilty by a court in the Netherlands.

Bert Ammerman, a New Jersey school principal whose brother, Tom, was killed in the bombing, said he and other relatives of victims won't believe Gaddafi has agreed to cooperate until they actually see the defendants arrive in the Hague, where a trial would be held.

[RB: Megrahi and Fhimah arrived at Camp Zeist on 5 April 1999.]

UK goverment adamant in opposing neutral venue trial

[What follows is the Hansard report of an exchange that took place in the House of Commons on this date in 1997 arising out of a question to the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook:]

HC Deb 28 October 1997 vol 299 cc700-702

Mr Dalyell If he will make a statement about his meeting with the Lord Advocate in September on the issues arising out of new information on Lockerbie and Libyan sanctions.

Mr Robin Cook I met my noble Friend the Lord Advocate on 4 September. His view remains that the available evidence supports the case against the two accused Libyans, and that there is no evidence of the involvement of nationals of any other country in the Lockerbie bombing. I fully accept that assessment.

It is for the Libyan authorities to fulfil their clear duty to surrender the two men accused of that act of mass murder to stand trial in Scotland. I am today inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Arab League and the Organisation of African Unity to send a delegation to Scotland, to show them the judicial system there and to discuss arrangements for a trial in Scotland with international observers.

Mr Dalyell Since one of the reasons given by the Foreign Secretary for objecting to a trial on Lockerbie in The Hague is that the Americans might refuse to submit evidence that they held to a court outside Scotland or the United States, can we reflect on why the Americans should do that? Is there a suggestion that the Americans might be unwilling, after nine years, to give information to the Dumfries and Galloway police?

Mr Cook We have had full co-operation throughout from the United States authorities and they have shared fully with the investigating powers all the evidence available to them. It would not be possible, however, to mount a prosecution without the co-operation of the US authorities, who hold part of the evidence. Most of those killed on the Pan Am jet were Americans, and the majority of their relatives do not want a trial to take place outside Scotland or the United States.

Sir Teddy Taylor As the interest of those who lost their relatives in the dreadful disaster is that a trial should take place and the guilty parties be identified and punished, is the Foreign Secretary really saying that there are no circumstances in which he will consider a trial outside Scotland, especially as the Libyans have already said that they would willingly surrender the two accused to an independent party—perhaps Egypt—if the trial were held in any third country?

Mr Cook If I may correct the hon Gentleman, what happened at Lockerbie was not a disaster; it was murder. No one in the House should forget that. I find it strange that it should be argued that a trial by Scots judges under Scots law in another country would be fair, but a trial by Scots judges under Scots law in Scotland would not. We have nothing to be defensive about concerning the impartiality of our courts, and I shall be proud to display that when I meet the delegation.

Mr Menzies Campbell I welcome the Foreign Secretary's announcement of the invitations that he has extended. Is the assertion that no fair trial can be obtained in Scotland not only unfounded but unnecessarily provocative? If the test of fairness of a judicial system is transparency, does not the Scottish system stand comparison with many others, including the Libyan system? May not fairness be established by the presence of independent observers at every stage of the legal process?

Mr Cook The hon and learned Gentleman makes some fair points about the nature of the Scottish legal system. It is, after all, the legal system to which we subject our citizens. I see no reason why there should be a separate system for those from Libya, but I understood that other countries may not be so persuaded. That is why I have made in good faith the offer that we are willing to discuss any reservations that other countries may have, confident in the knowledge that we can put them right. We would welcome monitors and observers from them at a trial so that justice could not only be done but be seen internationally to be done.

Mr Godman It is almost nine years since that terrible night when Pan Am flight 103 fell out of the sky. As one who has all along argued that those deemed guilty of that terrible crime should stand trial in the High Court in Edinburgh and not in America, may I offer my sincere compliments to my right hon Friend for arguing the case that such a trial should take place in Edinburgh?

Mr Cook I am grateful to my hon Friend for his support.

[RB: Ten months later, in August 1998 the UK Government finally conceded that a trial under Scots law should take place in the Netherlands.]

Legal opinion openly and publicly expressed grave doubts

[On this date in 2009 an article headlined Malta and Lockerbie by Dr George Vella, now Malta’s Minister of Foreign Affairs but then in opposition, was published in The Malta Independent on Sunday. It reads as follows:]

The role that Malta played helped resolve the question of sanctions on Libya, and to seek a fair trial of the two persons suspected of the crime.

The recent release of Abdel Basset al Megrahi from a Scottish jail on humanitarian grounds, and the controversy which has erupted on the decision of the UK and the Scottish authorities to grant such an amnesty, has once again brought the issue of the disaster at Lockerbie to world attention.

I do not intend going into the merits or demerits of such a decision, but have to register my disappointment at the fact that Mr Megrahi, for reasons unknown, decided to, or was made to, abandon an appeal against the court sentence that had incriminated him as the person responsible for the Lockerbie disaster.

Over the past few years there has been mounting respected legal opinion that openly and publicly expressed grave doubts as to how correct the decision of the Scottish Court was that had found al-Megrahi guilty.

Serious doubts also emerged as to how reliable and how truthful certain witnesses were. Everything was pointing in the direction of a new trial, which most probably would have exculpated Mr al-Megrahi.

In all probability it would also have shattered, once and for all, the theory that the luggage containing the bomb that caused the disaster had been loaded at Malta airport.

I do not see how Malta can clear its name in this Lockerbie issue, now that the appeal has been abandoned.

This is very unfair, because there is mounting compelling evidence that the bomb could not have been loaded in Malta.

Besides, it is doubly unfair because we only got bad publicity.

There is little if any recognition of the fact that whatever was happening in Libya was impacting negatively on our daily lives in Malta… socially, economically and politically.

The 1992 UN-imposed air and arms embargo, and the application of selective sanctions, bore heavily on the quality of life of the Libyan population, and brought about hardship and suffering… and Malta became the main exit point for Libyans who had to travel to anywhere in Europe and beyond. The daily ferry trips from Tripoli brought to Malta an ever increasing number of Libyans, both the well intentioned who came for business, for healthcare or for onward travel, as well as less sedate and more rowdy youngsters dead bent on having a good time in Malta’s entertainment spots.

One could say that what financial loss we experienced from tourists who kept away from our shores because of Malta’s proximity to Libya, was made good by the increase in business generated by large numbers of Libyans arriving daily by sea, as well as by the increased revenue from the use they made of Air Malta flights.

For Malta, the whole Lockerbie saga also had interesting political aspects.

While sanctions lasted, both the Nationalist (1992-1996) and Labour (1996-1998) governments had to find the right balance between maintaining the best of relations with Libya, (while condemning without any reservations the terrorist act and whoever mandated it), and at the same time observing in the most scrupulous of manners the spirit and the letter of the UN-imposed sanctions.

We set up a Sanctions Monitoring Committee, and were continuously under the scrutiny of western countries to ensure that nothing that was against the sanctions, or other “dual use” materials or equipment, passed through our ports en route to Libya.

It stands to reason that the most vigilant countries were the USA and the UK.

In spite of our limited resources, we managed to retain effective control and maintained the best of relations with everyone.

When I was entrusted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996, four years after the imposition of sanctions, the situation in Libya was becoming alarming and worrying.

It was becoming evident that the UN sanctions were having disastrous effects on the civilian population, not least in the fields of healthcare and medical services, while leaving the regime at the top unscathed. Such “wide” sanctions were not targeting particular sectors, and they were not being monitored as to whether they were achieving the desired results.

I always tended to agree with J Kenneth Galbraith when he opined that in modern times sanctions, boycotts, and embargoes tend to have “minimal effect”. He says that sanctions “are thought to be an attractive design for bringing recalcitrant governments to heel. Instead what occurs is a reallocation of resources and a sacrifice of nonessentials”. He concludes: “With sanctions hope is great, disappointment endemic”.

I expressed these opinions and concerns on all occasions when meeting other politicians. Undoubtedly, the most fruitful meeting was the one I had with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in Geneva in late April 1997, where, during a leisurely lunch I explained the whole situation to him, my concerns, and the way Malta was being affected. Mr Annan needed little persuasion to understand the situation, and agree that the general population in Libya was suffering unduly. He promised to follow it up with concrete measures.

As a matter of fact, he entrusted Deputy Secretary General Vladimir Petrovsky, with whom I also had had discussions, to make arrangements for a fact-finding mission to Libya, and to report back his findings for onward transmission to the Security Council.

Petrovsky and his delegation were in Libya between 13 and 18 December, and by the beginning of February presented a report that confirmed, without any shadow of doubt, the disastrous effects sanctions were having on the general population.

The report was factual, but the unwritten message was that when United Nations member states introduce sanctions they also have to shoulder the responsibility of ensuring that such sanctions do not prejudice the economic and social well-being of the general population.

A week after publishing his report, Mr Petrovsky, in recognition of the role we played in highlighting the humanitarian situation in Libya, came to see me in Malta and we gave a press conference together at which he spoke about his mission, his findings, and his recommendations.

Following Petrovsky’s report, the UN General Assembly, on 20 March, embarked on an open debate on the effectiveness of sanctions. Malta participated in this debate and we took the opportunity to explain clearly our views on the subject.

During all this time the USA and the UK kept insisting that Libya hand over to them for trial, in either the USA or Scotland, two men – Abdel Basset al-Megrahi and Lamin Kalifah Phimah, described as Libyan intelligence agents – who were to be charged with the planting of the suitcase bomb that caused the Lockerbie disaster.

Libya always insisted that these suspected Libyan citizens would never get a fair trial in either of these countries.

The standoff continued as both sides would not budge from their entrenched positions.

Libya repeatedly stated that it would accept a trial before a Scottish court sitting in a third country. Libyan Foreign Minister Omar Montasser, in a letter to the President of the Security Council in January 1998, wrote that Libya “accepted the proposal of the League of Arab States that the two suspects should be tried by a court in a neutral country and that they should be tried at The Hague by Scottish judges and in accordance with Scottish law”.

When I visited the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in his traditional tent in a military complex in Sirte on 7 March 1998 at the end of a long meeting, during which no reference was made to the Lockerbie stalemate, he asked me whether I could do him the favour of relaying a message to the UK Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, who he knew I was to meet in London in a few days’ time.

He asked me to convey to the British Foreign Secretary his solemn commitment that if the Libyan proposal to have a trial in a neutral third country under Scottish law was accepted by the UK and USA, he would be willing to hand over the suspects,

On 26 March, I was at the UK Foreign Office in London meeting Robin Cook.

My acquaintance and friendship with Robin, through party relations, went back to well before he became Foreign Minister. Even so I must say I was at a loss as to how to broach the subject of Lockerbie in our discussion, as after years of stalemate and Libyan intransigence, it had become a sore topic to discuss. Luckily it was Robin himself who provided the opportunity by asking me how my meeting with Muammar Gaddafi had gone.

When I passed on Gaddafi’s message and promise, Robin Cook seemed pleasantly surprised, acknowledged the commitment expressed and promised to work on it, as he wished to get this issue out of the way as soon as possible. He asked me whether he could count on us as a go-between if need be, and wanted to know where the suspects would spend their prison term if found guilty.

I told him I had to refer back for an answer, but informed him that the Libyan Foreign Minister Montasser had qualified Gaddafi’s commitment by saying that they would only accept a trial under Scottish law, as this did not include the death penalty; that during the trial no extra charges against the suspects would be contemplated; and that if found guilty the suspects would not be sent to a US jail.

We informed the State Department of these recent developments through our Embassy in Washington, and got the impression that whereas they were happy with developments, they would rather let the UK take the initiatives. This attitude is also expressed in Madeline Albright’s autobiography, when explaining the pressure she was under from the families of the Lockerbie victims to take effective action.

I know for a fact that the British started exploring the possibility of changing their stance and, apart from doing further research on the Libyan proposal through their contacts, also started exploring the possibility of enacting legislation so that a Scottish Court could hold a trial under Scottish law in The Hague.

With Robin Cook’s knowledge, I had separate meetings in April with Belgian Foreign Minister Derycke in Brussels, as well as with the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in Bonn, who were both enthusiastic about the prospects of a breakthrough.

In the same month I had two other meetings with Robin Cook, one in Palma de Majorca and the other in Brussels, during which he briefed me on developments, and I renewed our commitment to be of help if needed.

On 19 May I had a scheduled meeting with Libyan Foreign Minister Montasser in Cartghena, Columbia where we were both attending a meeting of the non-aligned countries. Mr Montasser brought me “au courant” on what was happening through discreet diplomatic contacts, and reiterated Libya’s commitment to keep its promise if the UK and the US accepted the notion of a trial held in a neutral third country under Scottish law.

On 21 July the information reaching the Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Middle Eastern Affairs Section of the State Department was that a deal had not yet been done, but it looked as if it was going to go through, as the US had agreed, together with the UK, to try the Lockerbie suspects under Scottish law in The Netherlands with a senior Scottish judge and a panel of international judges but no jury.

Concerns were expressed as to whether Gaddafi would keep his promise and let the suspects go to trial. Malta’s help was again solicited, if the need arose.

These views and doubts as to whether Gaddafi would keep his word were expressed in the press. The Guardian wrote about “New Move to Force Trial of Lockerbie Bomb Suspects”, and another piece entitled “Lockerbie: the West takes a gamble”, reflected the lack of faith the West had in Libya’s credibility.

That same evening, following the speculation in the press, Ceefax reported that Rosemary Wolf, the representative of the American relatives of the Lockerbie victims, said she had been told by Madeline Albright that a trial under Scottish law, but not on Scottish soil was being explored, which sparked off a lively debate on the whole issue during adjournment time in the House of Commons.

This was the 15th adjournment debate on Lockerbie, but contrary to the others this debate was one that saw hope in finding a way out of the impasse. As one member put it, “This adjournment debate is really a plea of encouragement for such a course of action.”

The next day the world press headlines were all about the possible “softening” of the US and UK stance on Lockerbie; the possibility of the Pan Am 103 Trial moving to The Hague; Madeline Albright being reported lobbying American relatives of the Lockerbie victims to accept a trial of the Libyan suspects under Scottish law in The Hague and other headlines expressing general agreement and praising the breakthrough.

In the meantime, I was asked to ascertain once again the Libyan position, in view of the imminent decision that was to be taken by the UK and the US.

On the morning of 22 July I once again contacted Libyan Foreign Minister Omar Montasser by phone.

Mr Montasser asked me to pass on the following information – that the Libyan government was standing firm in its intention to accept a trial of the suspects in a third country, a neutral country. He mentioned The Hague, but he even mentioned Malta. He told me that Libya was ready to discuss details if there was a UN Security Council Resolution providing for this option and that Libya would accept a trial under Scottish law, with a whole bench of Scottish judges, or with a Scottish Chief Justice and a bench made up of other international judges. As to where the alleged suspects were to spend their time in jail if found guilty, Montasser told me that Libya was ready to discuss this and come to an agreement before the trial. Asked whether Libya would accept extradition of condemned suspects to another country in which to spend their sentences if found guilty, Montasser replied that this would be discussed and decided on at Security Council level.

I informed Montasser that I was going to convey his message to Robin Cook, and that I would keep in contact, were I to have any replies or further questions.

That same day this message was relayed to both the British Foreign Office as well as to the US State Department. To this message we added that, for our part, we felt that this commitment from Libya was useful in helping them form an opinion and come to a decision, and secondly we conveyed our feeling that with this option, the Libyans, according to our reading, “will play ball”.

That same day a message was sent by the US State Department to all the US Embassies around the world, explaining the US position on the matter, in view of the fact that “Although no decision has yet been made to pursue the case in another venue, that option is now being actively considered.”

On 24 August, a month later, the UK and the US sent a joint letter to the UN Secretary General, informing him of the agreed arrangements, outlining the parameters within which the trial was to be held, and detailing what they expected of the Libyan authorities by way of cooperation. They informed Kofi Annan that the initiative they were presenting was a sincere attempt “… to resolve this issue, and is an approach which has recently been endorsed by others, including the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Non Aligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference.”

The letter from the UK and the US ended by expressing trust “that Libya will respond promptly, positively and unequivocally by ensuring the timely appearance of the two accused in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish Court…”

Two days later, the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation in Libya expressed general agreement with the terms outlined in the letter from the US and the UK to the UN Secretary General.

A draft UN Resolution, covering the agreement and the modalities within which the trial was to be held, was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 27August 1998.

Our only remaining task then was to exhort the Libyan authorities to keep their promise and abide by the resolution. This the Libyan authorities did without fail.

As the saying goes, “The rest is history”!

As a footnote to this rather lengthy explanation as to why Malta should not be made to carry the burden of a negative image because of any involvement in the Lockerbie tragedy, it has to be said that, on the contrary, Malta has to be commended for undertaking such an onerous diplomatic task and for contributing in its small way to the solution of a political issue that could have had far worse consequences, had it been left to continue indefinitely for years.

Documents to accompany Dr Swire's EIBF contribution

The following documents accompany Dr Jim Swire’s contribution to today’s Edinburgh International Book Festival session Megrahi: A spectacular miscarriage of justice?

1.  Foreword by Tam Dalyell MP to Cover-up of Convenience by John Ashton and Ian Ferguson (2001)

Seldom can an act of terrorism have had so many layers of sinister intrigue as the Lockerbie bombing. It was ten days after the disaster, on the evening of 31 December 1988 – Hogmanay – that I first became aware something very odd was afoot. A constituent, who I knew was an off-duty Lothian and Borders Police officer, pulled me aside at a function. He told me in confidence about disturbing events he had witnessed in the preceding days, while assigned to the Lockerbie crash site helping the Dumfries and Galloway force search the site. He described how American agents were swarming around the area, openly removing items of debris. He was concerned, not only because they appeared to be riding roughshod over the rules of evidence gathering required of a criminal investigation, but also because the police were doing nothing to stop them. My initial reaction was, ‘Well, one can hardly deny the Americans, since they’ve lost 175 citizens.’ During the following weeks I talked to more officers, some of whom had been left seething by similar experiences with the mysterious Americans.

Five years later, because I had repeatedly raised Lockerbie issues in the Commons, I was introduced to Allan Francovich, a remarkable American film-maker who had just begun to make his landmark Lockerbie documentary The Maltese Double Cross. His dogged investigation suggested that the ‘official version’ of the bombing (which insisted it was, in the words of one US official, a ‘Libyan government operation from start to finish’) was a sham and that the real culprits lay outside of Libya. More worryingly, he presented compelling evidence that the CIA was complicit in the disaster and, in so doing, made sense of the troubling accounts of my police sources.  Although not the first investigator to advance this ‘alternative version’, he did so with a degree of detail that was too great to be ignored. The British and American governments’ extraordinary joint campaign to discredit the film was both an indicator of how close Francovich had got to the truth and a disturbing reminder of the lengths to which some of those in authority would go to keep the lid on the affair.

Francovich’s sudden death in 1997 came as a massive blow, but
thankfully his deputy John Ashton has kept alive his spirit of inquiry.

In 1999 I became aware of another earnest seeker after the truth, Ian Ferguson, who was at the time producing a documentary for US National Public Radio. He is one of those rare individuals who, like Francovich and Ashton, is prepared to ask the awkward questions and devote many long hours to the search for answers. His reporting of the events surrounding the trial, for Scotland’s Sunday Herald newspaper and on his website thelockerbietrial.com, has been unsurpassed and has frequently rattled the cages of authority. I was delighted to learn that he and Ashton had collaborated to produce this book.

As an MP, I have seen it as my role to complement the efforts of the various investigators and the equally remarkable work of the British Lockerbie victims’ relatives, by raising questions in Parliament, and to that end I have so far initiated 16 adjournment debates. The sixth of these, held on 1 February 1995, was answered by the then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. I am told it was the only occasion since the war that a senior cabinet minister had replied to a backbencher’s adjournment debate. I am a creature of instinct and I sensed that he and the other ministers who have replied over the years were uncomfortable with having to peddle the official line. Later that day, Douglas spotted me talking to his then shadow and eventual successor Robin Cook MP. My diary entry for the day reads:

“Douglas [Hurd] swooped down on Robin and myself in the corridor by the window opposite the clerk’s assistant’s office. He said, ‘I really do ask you two to believe that as Foreign Secretary I cannot tell the [Scottish] Crown Office [which was in charge of the Lockerbie case] what to do, nor does the Foreign Office have detailed access to evidence which they say they have. You must understand that law officers really are a law unto themselves.’ Robin and I agreed that Douglas Hurd was not unfriendly towards us, and was probably correct in outlining the rules. Robin said that he guessed that Hurd was being honest with us and did not know the full story. I shrugged my shoulders, and told Robin he was probably right.”

One of the most remarkable, but least reported, revelations in the recent trial of the two Libyans was that even the Crown Office did not know the ‘full story’ when it indicted the pair in 1991. Indeed, it was not until the trial was underway that it learned that its star witness was highly unreliable. The CIA had known this for well over a decade, yet had not seen fit to make available the crucial paperwork documenting this man’s failings. Evidence heard at the trial also confirmed the long-held suspicion that CIA agents were involved in the highly irregular activities at the crash site witnessed by my police sources.

In my view, these facts alone warrant the public inquiry that has always been the demand of the British victims’ relatives. I have no doubt that there is much else in this book that will add weight to that demand. My government colleagues promised such an inquiry when in opposition and I trust that, as men of honour, they will make good that pledge.


2.  Letter  to Jim Swire from Chief Constable, Dumfries & Galloway Police

Dear Dr Swire,                                                   2 April 2012                           

I refer to your recent correspondence headed ‘Apparent Suppression of Evidence’. This letter seeks to fulfil the undertaking I gave you to provide you with an unambiguous response to concerns you raised regarding the handling of statements and evidence in connection with the insecurity detected at Heathrow.

I can confirm the following:

1.    In January 1989 BAA security notified the Metropolitan police that an insecurity had been detected within terminal 3 at Heathrow during the early hours of 21 December 1988.

2.    The Metropolitan police passed this evidence to the Police Incident Room at Lockerbie and Actions were raised to investigate this matter.

3.    During the course of this investigation Mr Manly, the BAA Security Team Leader who discovered the insecurity, was interviewed by an officer from the Metropolitan Police and a statement was obtained from him. The interview took place on 31 January 1989. A number of other witnesses were also traced and interviewed regarding the insecurity.

4.    Mr Manly’s statement was passed to the police incident room at Lockerbie and was registered on the HOLMES system on 2 February 1989. This statement and those from other witnesses identified At Heathrow were considered by enquiry officers at the time in the context of a range of emerging strands of evidence.

5.    In 1991 the police report outlining the evidence against Mr Megrahi and Mr Fhima was submitted to the Crown Office. This report did not contain a reference to the insecurity at Heathrow and made no mention of Mr Manly's statement.

6.    The surrender of Mr Megrahi and Mr Fhima for trial in the Netherlands prompted a massive preparation exercise during the course of which over 14,000 witness statements were provided to Crown Office in 1999. Mr Manly's statement was included in the material supplied to Crown though again the police made no reference to it.

7.    In 2001, as a result of Mr Manly contacting defence representatives, the insecurity at Heathrow was subject to a fresh investigation, the Crown disclosed the relevant statements to the defence and as you know the matter was considered during Mr Megrahi's first appeal. The appeal judges, in rejecting the appeal, made it clear that their assessment of the significance of this additional evidence must be conducted in the context of the whole circumstantial evidence laid before the trial court and concluded that "it cannot be said that the verdict falls to be regarded as a miscarriage of justice on account of having been reached in ignorance of the additional evidence" As the Lord Advocate explained at the meeting in London it is not for the appeal court to look at the case "afresh", it has to consider the new evidence in the context of the whole case that the trial court had before it.

In summary I can categorically state that no suppression of evidence took place and I hope this information alleviates your concerns in that regard.

(Signed) Patrick Shearer, Chief Constable.


3.  The place of Lockerbie in world events, a review by Neil Berry of John Ashton’s Megrahi: You are my Jury

Published by the plucky Scottish press Birlinn, John Ashton’s new book Megrahi: You are my Jury: The Lockerbie Evidence casts grave doubt on the validity of Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi’s conviction as the Libyan terrorist responsible for blowing up Pan Am Flight 103 and murdering 259 mostly American people in December 1988. At the same time, it raises deeply disturbing questions about the United States and United Kingdom’s boasted commitment to truth and justice.

It is perhaps no surprise that the mainstream British media are fighting shy of according this bulky volume the attention it deserves. For to discuss its contents would mean re-visiting a vastly acrimonious episode that threatened to poison relations between Britain and the US: The early release in August 2009 from his Scottish prison — on grounds that he was dying of cancer — of a Muslim convict who was seen by many as the personification of evil.

A member of Megrahi’s legal team, John Ashton is liable to the charge that his familiarity with the Libyan has clouded his judgment, but his book — which intersperses an exhaustive examination of the evidence that led to his conviction with Megrahi’s own testimony — collates the work of several hands and is a model of forensic rigor. It is indeed hard to believe that any fair-minded person could read it without being persuaded that Megrahi was the victim of a grotesque miscarriage of justice. The powerful impression left by the book is that Megrahi, who had run security for Libyan Arab Airlines while engaging in clandestine trading, had the ill-luck to be in Malta, the putative point of origin of the Lockerbie bomb, at the wrong time, and that he was framed because the US found it convenient to point the finger of blame at Libya.

What has never been widely recognized is that the blowing up of Pan Am 103 over the Scottish town ofLockerbie took place six months after the shooting down of an Iranian airbus over the Persian Gulf in July 1988 by the American battle cruiser, the USS Vincennes, with the deaths of 290 Iranians. It was an outrage Iran immediately vowed to avenge, and all the indications were that it was Iran, acting through the shadowy terrorist splinter group, the Palestine Popular Struggle Front, that mandated the Lockerbie operation. If, in the aftermath of Lockerbie, the US shrank from confrontation with Tehran, it was because, on top of seeking to negotiate the release of American hostages held by Iranian-backed terrorists, it was concerned to have a free hand in repelling Saddam Hussein’s attempt to annex Kuwait to Iraq.

Yet a scapegoat for Lockerbie was imperative and Libya, with an egregious leader, Col Qaddafi, whose image in the West was that of a deranged tribal savage, figured as the ideal candidate. John Ashton’s book underlines how readily the Western public accepted the case for imposing crippling sanctions on Libya as the culprit for Lockerbie. Few demurred when — even before he was sentenced by 3 Scottish judges at a special court in the Netherlands in 2001 — US President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright repeatedly described Megrahi not as a suspect but as a mass murderer.

All this would be chilling enough — even if the case against Megrahi were a more compelling one. In truth, his conviction relied on the testimony of a shopkeeper in Malta who had but the sketchiest memory of selling clothes to an Arab customer around the time when a suitcase containing the bomb was supposedly put on a feeder flight to London, there to be loaded onto Pan Am 103. It relied, too, on a circuit board, alleged to have been part of the bomb and to have derived from a batch of Swiss timing devices sold to Libya, though it was to transpire that this item of evidence — found far from the Lockerbie crash site — had nothing to do with the timers in question. What is particularly shocking is how much material evidence was withheld from Megrahi’s trial — including the striking circumstance that the night before Pan Am 103 flew from London Heathrow, the airport was broken into.

The assumption that the Lockerbie bomb originated in Malta may well have deflected attention from a far more productive line of inquiry.

Megrahi endured his 8-year Scottish incarceration in the bitter knowledge that he had been convicted on a basis that came nowhere near to satisfying the principle that guilt should be proved “beyond reasonable doubt.” Following 9/11, however, he felt that his chances of ever clearing his name had all but vanished. Certainly, the belief that he was the “Lockerbie bomber,” a malevolent Muslim who had carried out Britain’s worst ever terrorist atrocity, lodged deep in the public mind — so deep that when he was diagnosed as having only months to live and Scottish Justice Secretary, Kenny MackAskill, decreed he should be allowed to return to Libya to die, there was widespread outrage, not least in the United States.

In Britain and the US, many were of the opinion that Megrahi was the beneficiary of a squalid oil deal struck with Qaddafi by Britain’s sometime Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and that British and Scottish politicians were not only colluding with a vile regime but insulting the dead.

Outrage about the commutation of his sentence grew as Megrahi confounded Scottish medical expectations regarding his survival prospects, living on in Tripoli until May of this year. And though he remained desperately ill, there were to be vindictive demands, following the toppling of Col Qaddafi in 2011, that he be made to face justice in the United States.

Yet on the evidence of John Ashton’s book it is not his truncated sentence that ought to be on British and American consciences. It is the fact that Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi was ever convicted at all.