Showing posts sorted by date for query "prisoner transfer agreement". Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query "prisoner transfer agreement". Sort by relevance Show all posts

Thursday 20 December 2018

MacAskill: I’ve never believed Megrahi to be the bomber

[An article by Kenny MacAskill in today's edition of The Scotsman is headlined Lockerbie bomber was freed ‘to protect Scotland’, says Kenny MacAskill. It reads in part:]

... as justice secretary in 2009, it was my responsibility to consider applications for prisoner transfer and compassionate release made by Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, the only man every convicted of the crime. That saw me engage with state leaders as well as with the families of the victims from around the globe, for Lockerbie was truly international in its dimensions both with those who perpetrated it and those who suffered by it.

As with the atrocity itself, that period is also ingrained in my memory. It couldn’t be anything else given the significance of it and the focus that fell upon me. I realised it was going to be big but it was impossible at the outset to realise just how big. Later, finding my face on the front page of the Wall Street Journal and other international media brought it home.

But, though I’m now part of what seems a never-ending saga, my own involvement was quite truncated, most taking place over a short space of time from spring 2009, when an application for prisoner transfer was submitted by Libya, through to August of that year when I made my decision to release on compassionate grounds.

Of course, there had been involvement before as, just weeks into my tenure in 2007, it was announced that the UK and Libya were seeking to conclude a prisoner transfer agreement (PTA). There was of course only one Libyan national detained in Scotland and it was evident that the UK’s intention was his release. Indeed, Jack Straw, the UK justice secretary, was quite open about it when I spoke to him. BP were seeking a major oil contract and without it the deal would go to an American competitor.

New Labour had either forgotten about devolution or failed to notice that an SNP administration was now in charge at Holyrood. The First Minister quickly raised objections and the UK realised that there were complications. However, though I was involved in discussions, much was dealt with by Alex Salmond given the constitutional aspect.

As debate raged on over the PTA, however, a further twist in the tale came when Megrahi was diagnosed with terminal prostate cancer. I was advised of that in September 2008 but things still seemed a long way off, as arguments over prisoner transfer continued and his illness was in its early stages. Indeed, I recall a conversation with my wife at Hogmanay that year when I explained it would be my decision but there still seemed no immediacy.

But, by spring 2009 the pace was picking up as the UK ignored Scottish objections and signed a treaty with Libya. Likewise, Megrahi’s health was worsening and it would only be a matter of time before an application for compassionate release would be submitted.

The months following were to become quite frenetic. Prisoner transfer applications have set timetables and accordingly the clock was ticking. Invariably the responsibility was compounded by us being not just a minority administration but the first ever SNP one. If there were to be political casualties then they would be limited to one. The decision would be for me alone.

However, I was remarkably well supported by staff, even more so as the days passed and pressure mounted. There was no consensus that could be brokered or solution that would see it all just go away. Accordingly, I resolved that the decision I had to make wouldn’t be subject to economic or strategic issues but based on the laws and guidance that applied. They would be followed scrupulously and wherever possible information and actions would be open and public.

That remained the policy of the Scottish Government throughout.

The only red line I ever set was that Megrahi wouldn’t die in a Scottish prison cell. Rejection of either or both applications remained open until my final conclusions but it simply meant that he’d never be allowed to pass away here, even if it meant being medically evacuated at the very last moment. I wasn’t prepared to risk the lives of those who worked in health or prisons through the creation of a martyr and attacks following from those who perpetrate such terror. Events in cities around the globe since then have simply confirmed my view.

But increased security soon surrounded me as governments and organisations from far and wide sought to make their views known. Locked car doors and being driven everywhere were immediately noticeable, though to the chagrin of my driver I often insisted on walking. Hourly drive-bys by police vehicles at home and my office, and even panic alarms installed at both. Sadly, that level of intrusion also impacted on others as my wife from whom I’d recently separated also required to endure it.

It did, though, create a bond with those who worked with me and shared the risks that I’ll take to the grave.

My staff did their best to insulate me from undue pressure and I recall being advised that Robert Mueller, currently investigating President Trump but then FBI director, had sought to have a letter delivered personally to me. It was out of office hours and contrary to diplomatic protocols and his request was speedily rejected by my office, who advised it could be delivered to St Andrews House in the usual manner. I remained sound asleep oblivious to it all but was told that a police armed response team had been scrambled to my address just in case, greatly endearing me to them ever since.

To make a decision, evidence had to be heard from victims’ families and States. Much was harrowing indeed with many meetings being distressing for staff and myself. Governments varied in their attitudes. The Libyans convivial but with an underlying hint of menace; the Americans business like but co-operative with information; whilst the UK was shameless, all the time conniving for Megrahi’s release but equally insisting it was nothing to do with them.

Many politicians were equally shameful. Labour in Scotland simply opposed whatever I did despite the risks to the nation and the collusion of their London colleagues with Libya. Tories likewise condemned whilst former Tory ministers sought to lobby on behalf of Anglo-Arab business interests.

As is now well known I refused the prisoner transfer request as it was clear that there had been a UN brokered agreement between UK/USA and Libya that sentences would be served in Scotland.

The legal criteria for compassionate release were also met and so I rejected the former but granted the latter.

It’s a decision I stand by to this day and whilst some disagree, with it few can fault the procedure. Indeed, information that has since come to light since has simply confirmed my view. I always knew that Scotland was but a small cog in a much bigger international wheel. The British and Americans, whatever their public utterances, were colluding with Gadhafi on everything from training his special forces to rendering prisoners to him. Tony Blair’s embrace of the Libyan despot was matched by the fawning over his family by Hillary Clinton and the desire of the west for trade deals and strategic alliances

At the same time the supposed hero’s welcome received by Megrahi on his return to Libya was shown to have been fake news which the British and Americans were aware of. But they were never going to allow truth to stand in the way of an opportunity to heap opprobrium on Scotland. (...)

Questions remain over the conviction of Megrahi but whilst I’ve never believed him to be the bomber, he most certainly was no innocent abroad. He was the highest-ranking official Libya would release and the lowest one the west would accept. [RB: There is absolutely no evidence that I am aware of that the west sought higher-ranking officials than Megrahi and that Libya refused; and, given my contacts with the Libyan government during my efforts to secure a Lockerbie trial, I am sure I would have been informed.]

But the UK and USA know the full story, even if a court never will, having their spies and even getting their sources out. Sadly, that’s why the conspiracy theories will run for ever with me now part of them.

Thursday 17 May 2018

Shameless behaviour over Libya

[What follows is excerpted from an article by Kenny MacAskill in today's edition of The Scotsman:]

Robin Cook became Foreign Secretary in 1997 amid much fanfare about an ethical foreign policy. That lasted a matter of weeks before arms sales to Indonesia intervened and a muting of the sound was required. 

To be fair, Cook was a good man who tried to do the right thing and showed his mettle and his principles by resigning from office over the Iraq War. However, it also showed how difficult it can be to abide by ethical values when the needs of a state intrude. (...)

However, New Labour gave up any pretence of an ethical foreign policy after Tony Blair rode shotgun for George W Bush on the invasion of Iraq. It was without any ethical basis and predicated on a lie. Having supped with the devil, Blair seemed to lose any moral scruples on foreign policy, as shown by the shameless behaviour over Libya. 

When news of a UK and Libya ‘Prisoner Transfer Agreement’ first broke, Jack Straw sallied north to appease the new SNP administration’s concerns about its effect on Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. The UK Justice Secretary seemingly genuinely willing to remove Scotland’s only Libyan prisoner from the document until overruled by the Treasury and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which made clear the demands of Libya and the needs of the British state. [RB: See Jack Straw and the UK-Libya prisoner transfer agreement.]

Straw was no innocent on Libyan affairs as shown by the parliamentary apology tendered last week over the case of Abdel Belhaj, a Libyan dissident rendered into the Gadhafi regime’s hands by the US with the complicity of the UK. (...)

Belhaj and his pregnant wife weren’t the only prisoners rendered to Gadhafi’s Libya by the CIA and UK’s security services. There were others and they were returned to a despot that the UK was imposing international sanctions on and rightly condemned. To be fair to Cook, his initial involvement with Libya was simply to seek the release of the Lockerbie suspects for the trial that took place at Camp Zeist. His successors though discarded all pretence at justice and policy was dictated by the shameless pursuit of UK economic interests, irrespective of the welfare of innocents. 

When Blair made his deal in the desert and embraced Gadhafi, other connected events quickly followed. First was the signing of a huge oil deal and second the commencement of the prisoner renditions. For the deal was a two-way street with benefits for the Libyan regime as much as the UK. It wasn’t just a lessening of sanctions but also involved the supply of arms and even the training of Gadhafi’s elite troops by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).

That was exposed in an Amnesty International report shortly after I made the decision to release Megrahi on compassionate grounds – and not because of the Prisoner Transfer Agreement. Individuals are entitled to their view on that, but the criticism of it by Labour was brazen given the actions they were involved in. America was equally Brazen with Clinton and Obama pursuing commercial deals with Libya, as well as courting him as an ally against Islamism. They embraced the Gadhafi family before Megrahi was even released but were equally craven in their denunciations.

The great irony is that when the West realised that Gadhafi was neither going to change nor be reliable they turned on him once more.

Thursday 3 May 2018

Press briefing on behalf of Megrahi family

[What follows is the text of a press release issued today by Aamer Anwar & Co on behalf of the Megrahi family:]

Statement issued on behalf of the family of Mr Al-Megrahi by solicitor Aamer Anwar

“It has been a long journey in the pursuit for truth and justice. When Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie on the 21st December 1988 killing 270 people from 21 countries, it remains the worst terrorist atrocity ever committed in the UK. Nearly 30 years later many believe that Megrahi was the victim of a miscarriage of justice.

An application was lodged by my office in July 2017 with the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) seeking to overturn the conviction of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi for murder.

The application was submitted on behalf of :-

i)                    The immediate family members of the late Abdelbaset al-Megrahi including his wife Aysha Ali Ahmed and son Ali abdulbasit Al-Megrahi (aged 22)
ii)                  Dr Jim Swire, Rev’d John F Mosey and many other British relatives of passengers who died on board Pan Am Flight 103 continue to support this application.

The Commission had previously determined on the 28th June 2007 that Abdelbaset al-Megrahi may have suffered a miscarriage of justice in relation to his conviction and identified six grounds for referring the case to the High Court. We have asked the Commission to reconfirm these six grounds.  

Special circumstances
The Commission were asked to address the issue of whether it is in the interests of justice to refer the case to the High Court for a posthumous appeal. The Appeal was commenced but following the diagnosis of terminal cancer it was suddenly abandoned in 2009. The application being lodged dealt with the circumstances that lead to Mr Al-Megrahi abandoning his appeal.

To date both the UK Government and Scottish Government have claimed that they played no role in pressuring Mr  Megrahi into dropping his appeal as a condition of his immediate release. It was alleged that this was fundamentally untrue.

The question for the Commission was whether it regards it as in the interests of justice to refer a case back to the High Court where the convicted person himself had commenced an appeal on a SCCRC reference and then chosen to abandon it.

The answer depended on the precise circumstances in which the appellant came to abandon his appeal. Mr Megrahi's terminal illness; the fact that prisoner transfer was not open while the appeal was ongoing; and whether Mr Megrahi had no way of knowing that Kenny MacAskill would ultimately opt for compassionate release rather than prisoner transfer, or as is alleged that he was led to believe that he would not be released unless he dropped his appeal.

We welcome the news that today that the SCCRC having considered all the available evidence have confirmed that they believe then when Mr Megrahi abandoned his appeal, he did so as he believed he held a genuine and reasonable belief that such a course of action would result in him being able to return home to Libya, at a time when he was suffering from terminal cancer.

The case will now proceed to stage 2 and the Commission will conduct a full review of the conviction for the ‘Lockerbie Bombing’ in order to decide if the case is referred back to the Court of Appeal.

The reputation of the Scottish law has suffered both at home and internationally because of widespread doubts about the conviction of Mr Al-Megrahi. It is in the interests of justice and restoring confidence in our criminal justice system that these doubts can be addressed, however the only place to determine whether a miscarriage of justice did occur is in the appeal court, where the evidence can be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.


ONCE THE APPLICATION LODGED WITH THE SCCRC -WHAT HAPPENS?

1.      The case will be assigned to a case worker at the SCCRC and that worker will consider the case and provide a report to the Board (who sit once a month) The Board will consider whether to refer it back.

2.      The Board normally consider several cases at the same time but it is likely that in this instance the Board will convene specially to hear this application. 

3.      The SCCRC review and investigation process is described as thorough, robust, impartial and independent.

4.      On receipt of an application the Chief Executive of the Commission allocates the application to a legal officer. They obtain the court papers.
5.      The legal officer obtains any other further information he or she considers to be necessary so that the Board of the Commission can take a decision about whether to accept the application for review. 
6.      If the Board does not accept the application for review, the Chief Executive writes to the applicant and his or her representative to inform them of the Board's decision and the file is closed.
7.      If the Board accepts the application for review, they will write to all the relevant parties - e.g. The Crown, the Police and the Defence - to notify them that the application has been accepted for review and to request that they preserve for the duration of our review all documents and productions they hold relative to the case.
8.      They obtain then relevant papers from the Crown, the Police and the Defence. 
9.      Under normal circumstances the Legal Officer will conduct a review of the papers and issues in the case and will arrange to interview the applicant. 
10.  The Legal Officer prepares a case plan document setting out information relating to the evidence led at trial, the appeal, the grounds of review and his or her recommendations to take forward the review of the case.
11.  Within two months from the date of the acceptance of the application for review, the case plan is submitted to a Committee of two or three Board Members and the Chief Executive. The Committee consider the case plan and agree a course of action with the Legal Officer for the review of the case.
12.  The Legal Officer proceeds with the investigation and review, updating the Committee on the progress of the review every month or so and seeking guidance from the Committee and/or the Chief Executive where necessary.
13.  The review process should take no longer than nine months for conviction cases.
14.  After the review of the case is completed, the Committee take a view about whether or not the case should be referred to the High Court.
15.  The legal officer then prepares a draft statement of reasons for referral or non-referral for the Committee’s consideration. Once the Committee is content with the draft statement of reasons, the case is submitted to the Board of the Commission for a decision. 
16.  If the Board recommends a referral then the application will go back to the Appeal Court.
BACKGROUND TO THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

Mr Megrahi was convicted on the 31st January 2001 of the charge of murder following trial at the High Court of Justiciary sitting at Kamp van Zeist in the Netherlands. His co-accused Al-amin Khalifa Fimah was acquitted following trial. Mr Megrahi was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 27 years.

Appeal
Abdelbaset al-Megrahi’s first appeal was dismissed on the 14th March 2002.

The next appeal was mounted in consequence of the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission’s reference dated 28 June 2007.

Grounds of Appeal 1 and 2 were argued before the Court in full at a public hearing which took place between 28 April and 19 May 2009. On 7th July 2009 the Court indicated that one of its numbers, Lord Wheatley, had been hospitalised. It continued consideration of the grounds of appeal.

On 18th August 2009 Mr Megrahi with leave of the court, abandoned his appeal. No judgement or opinion has therefore been handed down by the Court upon these submissions.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONVICTION  

Pan Am flight 103 (“PA103”)
1.5 At 7.03pm on Wednesday 21 December 1988, shortly after taking off from Heathrow airport, PA103 was flying at an altitude of 31,000 feet en route to John F Kennedy airport, New York, when an explosion caused the aircraft to disintegrate and fall out of the sky. 243 passengers and 16 crew on board were killed. The victims came from 21 countries, the vast majority being from the United States.

1.6 The resulting debris was spread over a very wide area in Scotland and the North of England, but principally it landed in and around the town of Lockerbie causing the deaths of a further 11 people. In all 270 people were killed in the disaster.

1.7 A massive police operation was mounted to recover the bodies of the victims and as much of the debris as possible. The local police force, Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary (“D&G”), was assisted in the search operation by numerous officers from other forces in Scotland and England, as well as by military personnel and members of voluntary organisations.

Fatal Accident Inquiry
1.8 On 1 October 1990 a fatal accident inquiry was conducted by Sheriff Principal John Mowat QC. In his findings in fact, Sheriff Principal Mowat found that a Samsonite suitcase (“the primary suitcase”) containing a Toshiba radio cassette recorder loaded with a Semtex-type plastic explosive had been placed on board Pan Am flight 103A (“PA103A”) from Frankfurt to London Heathrow before being transferred to PA103; that the suitcase had probably arrived at Frankfurt on another airline and been transferred to PA103A without being identified as an unaccompanied bag; that the baggage had not been reconciled with passengers travelling on PA103, nor had it been x-rayed at Heathrow; and that the cause of all the deaths was the  detonation of the explosive device in luggage container AVE 4041 which had been situated on the left side of the forward hold of the aircraft.

1.9 Sheriff Principal Mowat concluded that the primary cause of the deaths was a criminal act of murder.

The police investigation
 1.10 It had been concluded very soon after the disaster that the likely cause had been the detonation of an improvised explosive device. From the date of the explosion and throughout the course of 1989-1991, an extensive international police investigation was carried out, principally involving the British and American investigating authorities, but also including the police forces of the former Federal Republic of Germany (“the BKA”) and of Malta.

1.11 Initially, suspicion fell upon Palestinian terrorist groups, in particular the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (“PFLP-GC”). However, in 1990 developments in the investigation turned its focus to Libya, and on 13 November 1991 a warrant was granted by a sheriff at Dumfries for the arrest of the applicant and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah (“the co-accused”), both Libyan nationals. On the following day the Lord Advocate issued an indictment setting out the charges against the two accused. Simultaneously, as a result of a federal grand jury investigation, the US Attorney General published an indictment in substantially similar terms to that issued by the Scottish authorities.

1.12 Following publication of the indictments, the UK and the US sought the handover of the two accused for trial, and throughout 1992 and 1993 the UN Security Council issued a number of resolutions calling upon Libya to do so. It also imposed extensive economic sanctions against that country. Libya denied any involvement in the crime.

Proposals for trial in the Netherlands
1.13 In 1998 the governments of the UK and the US wrote to the Secretary General of the UN indicating that they were prepared to arrange a trial of the two accused before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. The trial, it was proposed, would follow Scots law and procedure in every respect except that the jury would be replaced by a panel of three judges. Following Libya’s consent to the initiative, an agreement was entered into between the UK and the Netherlands to put it into effect. On the same date, the High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) (United Nations) Order 1998 came into force in the UK, regulating such matters as the constitution of the trial and appeal courts.

1.14 Lords Sutherland, Coulsfield and MacLean were appointed to form the panel of judges. Lord Abernethy was appointed as an additional judge to assume the functions of any member of the panel who died during the proceedings or was absent for a prolonged period. He was not required to carry out that function. The location of the court was chosen as Kamp van Zeist in the Netherlands.

1.15 On 5 April 1999, the applicant and the co-accused travelled to the Netherlands where they were arrested by Scottish police officers. On 14 April 1999 they were fully committed for trial, and were detained at premises within the court precincts. The indictment was served upon them on 29 October 1999.

The trial 
1.16 Preliminary pleas to the competency and relevancy of the charges were raised by both accused and argued on their behalf by counsel at a hearing on 7 December 1999. On 8 December, Lord Sutherland, sitting alone, held the charges to be both competent and relevant (see HMA v Al Megrahi (No 1) 2000 SCCR 177). Leave to appeal the decision was granted but no appeal was taken.

1.17 The trial commenced on 3 May 2000, and the cases for both accused closed on 8 January 2001. Neither the applicant nor the co-accused gave evidence.  Following submissions by the parties on 18 January 2001 the diet was adjourned to allow the judges to deliberate upon their verdicts.

1.19 The court returned its verdict on 31 January 2001. It unanimously found the co-accused not guilty. The verdict in relation to the applicant was recorded in the minutes of trial in the following terms (see also the transcript of proceedings on day 86 of the trial):
“The Court Unanimously found the Accused Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi GUILTY on the Second Alternative Charge but that under deletion of the words ‘and you Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifah [sic] Fhimah  did there and then cause a suitcase to be introduced to Malta’ in lines 4 to 6 of subhead (e) of said charge and under deletion of the words ‘said suitcase, or’ in line 4 of subhead (g) and under deletion of the word ‘similar’ in line [4] of said subhead (g)”.

1.20 The court sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment, backdated to 5 April 1999, and recommended that he serve a minimum period of 20 years before he could be considered for release on licence.

Post-trial developments 
Appeal 
1.21 The applicant lodged grounds of appeal against conviction on 11 June 2001 and leave to appeal was granted on 23 August 2001. The proceedings took place at Kamp van Zeist between 23 January and 14 February 2002, and the opinion of the court, rejecting the appeal, was issued on 14 March 2002.

Application to the European Court of Human Rights 
1.22 On 12 September 2002 the applicant’s defence team lodged an application (number 33955/02) with the European Court of Human Rights in which they argued that the applicant’s right to a fair trial had been infringed by, inter alia, prejudicial pre-trial publicity. On 11 February 2003 the court ruled the application inadmissible on the basis that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies by raising these issues in the domestic forum.

Diplomatic developments 
1.25 On 12 September 2003, the UN passed a resolution lifting all UN sanctions against Libya.

 “Punishment part” hearing
 1.26 At a hearing at the High Court in Glasgow on 24 November 2003 under the Convention Rights (Compliance) (Scotland) Act 2001, the punishment part of the applicant’s sentence was set at 27 years, again backdated to 5 April 1999. On 18 December 2003 the Lord Advocate appealed against the sentence as being unduly lenient. 

For further background please refer to:-

Tuesday 9 January 2018

Reflecting on Lockerbie

[This is the headline over an article by Kenny MacAskill published yesterday on the website of Cable magazine. It takes much the same line as his recent book and merits a similar response, such as those accorded to the book in reviews by James Robertson and John Ashton. Mr MacAskill's article reads in part:]

... this month brings the sixteenth anniversary of the conviction of Abel Basset Al Megrahi at a Scottish court convened at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands. He remains the only man convicted of the crime. Megrahi was released by me in 2009, on compassionate grounds, when I was Justice Secretary. In many ways, the trial has overshadowed both the events leading up to it, and actions subsequent to it. For some, it has become a cause célèbre and for others, simply the culmination of the tragedy.
Yet, the Lockerbie bombing is not just the story of one man and his journey through the courts. It is also one of international intrigue and diplomatic duplicity.  The atrocity didn’t happen in isolation – in many ways, it was the culmination of years of terror and counter-terror. The trial and subsequent appeals only formed part of a far wider picture, one in which vested state interests were being pursued, and in which economic goals mattered more than justice. (...)
For many, especially in Scotland, the Megrahi trial itself has come to overshadow the events that led up to both the atrocity and its consequences. Perceived or real failings amongst police, prosecutors, judges, or even myself, have often distorted scrutiny of the wider issues at play. The focus, even in the media, has been on the court case rather than on the economic and security deals being traded for prisoners, or on the nature of strategic alliances, of which there were many.
Reporting of the fact that evidence was denied to the Scottish court, and threats to close down Scottish press coverage of this issue, has been muted to say the least. I know this from discussions with an Editor threatened, and with the UK Minister doing the threatening. Even false news (a popular term at this point in time) has been allowed to become received wisdom, such as the so called ‘hero’s reception’ for Megrahi after his release and return to Tripoli (despite being exposed as fake by both WikiLeaks and former State Department officials).
Perhaps there should have been more wariness all those years ago, when an Italian air force plane in UN markings collected Megrahi and his co-accused – Al Amin Khalifah Fhimah – from Tripoli, to take them to the Netherlands for trial. For though this was to be a trial held under Scots law (albeit convened in a former Dutch air force base), the major ground rules had already been set. However, the Scottish judges presiding over the trials has not yet been notified of those rules.
Vested financial interests should perhaps also have been discerned. The first Scots lawyers to visit Gadhafi travelled on a plane provided by Babcock and Wilcox. Others later returned on the private jet of Tiny Rowland.
For the trial had been brokered by Britain and the United States, in negotiation with Libya, with the intervention of many other actors (the United Nations in particular) at the very highest levels. Sanctions were hurting Libya; it needed to negotiate. The West, for its part, wanted a strategic partner in the campaign against Islamic terror, as well as access to Libya’s natural resources. The trial came about just as major companies were lobbying for access to Libya. American companies in particular were concerned at European businesses – such as BP – gaining a foothold in the North African country while they were still excluded. Marathon Oil, among others, lobbied the White House relentlessly.
The negotiations eventually resulted in the Libyans choosing Scots law for the process, albeit in a neutral venue. Scots law would always be preferable to a trial in America where little justice could be expected, and where anyone convicted was unlikely ever to see the light of day again. Handing citizens over to the United States was as unacceptable to the Gadhafi regime as it remains to every Libyan grouping to this day.
The discussions also covered the question of who would appear for trial. Megrahi and Fhimah were offered up. Others, far more culpable and senior, were also sought by the police and prosecutors. But the deal brokered by the UN exculpated Gadhafi and his leading henchmen – like Abdullah Senussi, Gadhafi’s head of military intelligence – from facing justice. The Libyan leadership was thus given a get-out-of-jail card. Others were not so lucky.
Megrahi and his co-accused were the highest-ranking officials that the Libyans were prepared to sacrifice – and the lowest-ranking that the West would accept. Western interests dictated that it was acceptable to live with the Libyan leadership being absolved; but someone had to stand trial. The legal process provided cover for the political and economic deals the West wanted and so Megrahi and Fhimah were offered up in the Libyan national interest.
Advice from Scottish lawyers to the accused not to present themselves for trial was ignored: new Libyan lawyers provided by the Gadhafi regime made it clear that these men would be going to the Netherlands, no matter what. Libya, crippled by Western sanctions, required these two to take the fall for the country – and they were lightning conductors, drawing attention away from anyone higher up.
And so it was that one man – Megrahi – was convicted and the other acquitted, sixteen years ago this month. The trial process was highly unusual, not just in its setting but in its format, with three judges sitting without a jury.
There are certainly questions over the reliability of Megrahi’s conviction in light of evidence that has since come to light. That’s quite understandable given the circumstances of the attack, and the scale of the crime scene. Indeed, it was a quite remarkable police investigation and great credit should be given to those involved. That said, the post-trial evidence which has emerged doesn’t mean that Megrahi was uninvolved in the crime. A mere innocent abroad, he certainly was not. He was a senior Libyan agent, from Gadhafi’s tribe, married into senior families who had faithfully carried out the regime’s instructions, both before and after Lockerbie.
This will doubtless be the focus of yet more debate. That is understandable. (...)
People will continue to form their own judgements on my decision to release Megrahi on compassionate grounds. That’s their right and entitlement. But I stand by my position. Further information received since has only reinforced my view. (...)
Before that happened, however – and this is an issue which receives far less attention – I had the opportunity to transfer Megrahi. I chose to reject this opportunity. Prisoner transfer applications are routine and were invariably granted by me, as by both my predecessor and successor. The process applies to bringing Scots who have committed crimes abroad home, as well repatriating foreign offenders from our land.
What was unusual about this particular Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) was how it came about – and why I refused it. Indeed, it was the only one I ever rejected. As Jack Straw (then UK Home Secretary) told me, the UK-Libya PTA came about as the UK government sought to support BP’s interest in obtaining a lucrative contract in Libya. The imperative was simple – no transfer deal, no contract – and the UK was anxious that its own company benefit from the substantial profits to be made, and not an American competitor.
I rejected the transfer application for Megrahi. I did so not because it was the only one in existence that allowed for the state and not just the prisoner to apply; nor because there was only one Libyan prisoner in a Scottish jail – the man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing. I did so instead because it became clear that undertakings had been given at the time of the trial that any sentence given to Megrahi should be served in a Scottish prison.
This information came to me not from the UK government – which was focused only on driving through the Prisoner Transfer Agreement – but from Eric Holder, the United States Attorney General. At the time the trial was being agreed, he had been the Deputy Attorney General. He was therefore a man well-placed to know what had been agreed. Holder was adamant that any sentence meted out to Megrahi should be served in a Scottish jail, even if David Miliband, the UK Foreign Secretary at the time of my decision, was unforthcoming on the issue. That is why I ruled out a prisoner transfer application which I would normally have authorised. (...)
I’m used to people taking opposing positions on my decisions; that goes with the job. I do, however, object strenuously to the disparagement of those who served the Scottish justice system at this time. No system is foolproof and that’s why safeguards are built in. All systems can make errors and need to be able to accept and atone for them. But the constant focus on just one aspect of the Lockerbie tragedy ignores the much wider picture, and lets the British and American governments off the hook for their hypocrisy and duplicitous actions.
I believe those who were involved in the Scottish justice system, at all levels in this case, deserve praise and respect. Most especially, this should go to those who attended the horrific crash scene and dealt with it as best they could. They shouldn’t be defamed for alleged planting of evidence. The work was hard and horrifying – and all at a time before PTSD was properly acknowledged, never mind treated. A dogged and determined investigation should be appreciated for the fine skills the investigators deployed – not denigrated for alleged falsities. Then, at the trial stage, both prosecutors and judges acted professionally in dealing with the facts then before them.
There are good people who have genuine doubts about the integrity of the trial, such as Dr Jim Swire, who lost his daughter in the tragedy. Though I respect them, I profoundly disagree with them. Meanwhile, there are others who are part of a ‘Megrahi industry’ that has been in business since the corporate jets were first utilised. Conspiracy theories abound and most, as is usually the case, are simply nonsensical.
Meanwhile, it shouldn’t be forgotten that not just the American victims’ families but most others stand by the conviction, even if almost all recognise that there’s more still to come out. Much has, of course, been leaking out in dribs and drabs as further information about British and American links with Libya emerge, and as the CIA extract more people in the know from the failed Libyan state they’ve created. I’ve always supported the Scottish government’s position on the benefits of having an international enquiry to consider all aspects of the Lockerbie affair. A Scottish court alone has no powers to compel the necessary witnesses, or obtain the required information.
Yet while there are legitimate questions over the strength of the conviction, which I share, this bombing was carried out by Libya. The evidence shows it, Gadhafi admitted it, and the National Transitional Council which replaced him also accepted that his regime was culpable.
The Lockerbie bombing was the horrific culmination of years of terror and counter-terror. From atrocities at Rome and Vienna airports and bombings in Berlin bars, to sanctions on Libya and even air strikes on Gadhafi’s family compound in 1986. It culminated in the downing of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes in July 1988, killing all aboard. President Bush refused to apologise for this act and it caused outrage across the Arab world. A bounty was put up to avenge the act and that was accepted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC).
This group was planning the downing of a Pan Am airliner, resulting in the Helsinki warning in the form of a memorandum issued by the US State Department to American embassies. This has fuelled conspiracy theories ever since. In fact, all it showed is what we’ve come to experience in recent years: that security services know something is planned, but don’t necessarily know when or where, and security is tightened accordingly.
However, the detention of a PFLP-GC cell in Germany some two months before the Lockerbie bombing spiked the initial bombing plan. Those arrested had Pan Am timetables and bag tags, and were planning an operation in a similar style to what ultimately befell Flight 103. Thwarted this time, what was to be done to fulfil the contract?
The PFLP-GC operated closely with the Libyans – also with Syria, Iran, and other Middle East states. In the PFLP-GC’s time of need, the Libyans stepped into the breach to help them in their next, decisive, plan. Tripoli had been aware of what had been going on, as Gadhafi himself would later admit. Though, as he added, had they planned it, they wouldn’t have used Malta as it was too geographically close to Libya and would have raised suspicion. But, presumably needs must and so Libya finished off the terror strike initially planned by the Palestinians. There are serious questions as to just how the fateful bomb was placed aboard the Pan Am aircraft in Malta: it remains a mystery to this day. But Gadhafi confirmed that it was planted there.
Megrahi and Fhimah weren’t the principal parties involved, although – as noted earlier – suggestions of their complete innocence are fanciful. Those who would sanctify Megrahi forget he was a senior security service agent in a despicable regime. The idea that he just found himself in Malta on a false passport, with no apparent luggage as some innocent abroad, is absurd. I certainly doubt that he was the bomber, but given who he was and the roles he held, I have no doubt that he was involved in the wider operation. (...)
So as the anniversary comes round, people will form their own views and make their own judgements – on me, and on Scottish justice. But let them also examine the economic and strategic backdrop which saw sanctions dropped and prisoners rendered in return for access to natural resources and a strategic ally against Islamic terrorism. The process of justice around the Lockerbie bombing offered up two minnows but protected the major players – a situation which continues to this day. It was a process which also saw Britain and America condemn the release of Megrahi while openly consorting with Gadhafi.
The court case, like Scotland more broadly, was just one small cog in a far larger wheel.