Thursday, 30 March 2017

Secret talks about Megrahi repatriation

[What follows is a report that appeared in The Scotsman on this date in 2009:]

The SNP has been engaged in secret talks that could send the Lockerbie bomber home, it was reported last night.

It is claimed talks have taken place between SNP advisers and Libya as the Scottish Executive prepares to sign a pact on prison transfers this week.

Meanwhile the health of the man serving life for the Lockerbie bombing continues to deteriorate. Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi's cancer has now spread to his spine and pelvis.

Officially, the diplomatic meetings to discuss the future of the bomber are taking place between the Foreign Office and Libyan officials, because Scotland is not a sovereign state. But Kenny MacAskill, the justice secretary, has asked Robert Gordon, director general of the Executive's justice department, to play a major role in the discussions.

Meetings between Mr Gordon and a Libyan delegation began last October and included discussions with US senators.

Megrahi's legal team are being encouraged to apply for a prisoner transfer agreement (PTA) that would see him serve the remainder of his 27-year sentence in Libya.

The appeal is expected to take up to a year but Megrahi's health has deteriorated so much he may be forced to abandon the fight to clear his name.

Wednesday, 29 March 2017

Abu Nidal and Lockerbie

[On this date in 2008 a long article entitled Lockerbie: The Man Who Was Not There by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer was published on the OhmyNews International website. It contains lots of interesting material, including extensive quotes from Richard Marquise, the FBI’s chief Lockerbie investigator. The following is just one short excerpt from the article:]

Atef Abu Bakr is a former spokesman for the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) and one of Nidal's closest aides between 1985 and 1989. In a series of interviews published in the Arabic Al Hayat newspaper Bakr said that Abu Nidal told him that his organization was behind the explosion on Pan Am flight 103*.

"Abu Nidal told a meeting of the Revolutionary Council leadership: I have very important and serious things to say. The reports that attribute Lockerbie to others are lies. We are behind it."

"If any one of you lets this out, I will kill him even if he was in his wife's arms,"' Abu Nidal added, according to Bakr.

Having become persona non grata in Syria, Abu Nidal started his move from Syria to Libya in the summer of 1986. His operations, and those he falsely claimed, were bringing discomfort to Damascus. His move to Libya was completed by March 1987.

Settling in Tripoli, Abu Nidal and Libya's leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi, allegedly became close friends sharing, according to some observers, "a dangerous combination of an inferiority complex mixed with the belief that they were men of great destiny."

In the aftermath of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, Gaddafi, seeking to distance himself from Nidal, expelled him in 1999**.

Tuesday, 28 March 2017

Lockerbie investigations shelved

[What follows is the text of a report published on the website of The Scotsman on this date in 2004:]

Further investigations into the Lockerbie bombing have been quietly shelved despite the breakthrough in diplomatic relations with Libya, Scotland on Sunday can reveal.

Foreign Office officials have dashed the hopes of bereaved families that Tony Blair’s historic meeting with Colonel Gaddafi would enable them to seek more information about the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103.

Sources confirmed that the bombing of the airliner in 1988, for which Libya has now accepted responsibility, had been "the most difficult issue" during the exhaustive negotiations that led to the meeting in Tripoli last week. But it did not feature in the face-to-face talks between Blair and Gaddafi.

Despite ongoing investigations into the case of police constable Yvonne Fletcher, who was shot outside the Libyan embassy in London in 1984, it was clear last night that ministers have decided to let the Lockerbie issue drop.

It is believed that with one man already convicted of the bombing, there are no grounds to reopen the inquiries.

"I’m not aware that Lockerbie did introduce itself really," one senior FCO official said last night. "There is no doubt at all about the heinous nature of the crime, and it is always there in the background. But compensation has been agreed."

Blair’s decision to travel to meet Gaddafi in person was seen as a hugely risky move, particularly as the Libyan leader is still regarded as a sponsor of terrorism by some of the families who lost relatives in the disaster.

The government has striven to maintain contacts with the families during the long-term process of easing Libya back into the international community. It imposed conditions including the acceptance of responsibility for the bombing as well as the agreement to pay compensation to the families of those that died on Flight 103.

Blair sent ministers to consult with the families before his visit in order to win their blessing for the trip, and for the plans to do more business with the Libyans in the future.

But the venture sparked criticism from some quarters, including Tory leader Michael Howard, and a number of Americans who lost family members in the disaster.

Daniel Cohen, whose 20-year-old daughter Theodora was killed in the crash, called Blair’s initiative "obscene". He said: "Tony Blair came from a ceremony in Madrid - a memorial service to the victims of the second largest terrorist attack in Europe, and then hopped on a plane and went to Tripoli to embrace the architect of the largest terrorist attack in Europe."

Monday, 27 March 2017

Serious doubts on credibilty of Gauci

[What follows is the text of a report that was published in the Times of Malta on this date in 2012:]

Sliema shopkeeper Tony Gauci was always going to be the prosecution’s most important asset in pinning guilt for the Lockerbie bombing on Libyan Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi.

He was the only one to directly link Mr Megrahi to shards of clothing found at the bombing scene by identifying him as “the Libyan man” who went to buy clothes from his shop at around 6.30 p.m. on December 7, 1988.

Lockerbie investigators had concluded that the bomb on Pan-Am flight 103 was placed in a suitcase that contained clothing produced by Yorkie, a clothes manufacturer in Malta, and sold by Mary’s House in Sliema, which belonged to Mr Gauci and his brother Paul.

And Mr Gauci’s testimony proved to be the single most important element at the Lockerbie trial in Camp Zeist, The Netherlands, to help judges deliver a guilty verdict in January 2001.

But a fresh investigation by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, a body which investigates potential miscarriages of justice, has shed serious doubts on the credibility of Mr Gauci’s testimony.

The report, published for the first time in Scotland on the Sunday Herald’s website, provides an in-depth analysis of the evidence produced in Mr Megrahi’s trial and information that was withheld from the defence that could have been used to challenge Mr Gauci’s credibility.

The report also confirms media reports over the years, which were never challenged, that Mr Gauci and his brother Paul were compensated by the US State Department for the evidence that helped bring Mr Megrahi to justice.

It highlights excerpts of entries in a diary by Scottish police inspector Harry Bell, who took charge of the investigations in Malta, noting Mr Gauci’s interest in monetary compensation.

The commission found that none of the diary entries and memorandums Mr Bell authored, in which witness compensation was mentioned, were ever passed on to the defence.

Of particular interest was a memorandum Mr Bell drew up on February 21, 1991 for his superiors, six days after Mr Gauci had, for the first time, positively identified Mr Megrahi from a photo.

“During recent meetings with Tony he has expressed an interest in receiving money. It would appear that he is aware of the US reward monies which have been reported in the press,” Mr Bell wrote.

In a statement to the commission in 2006, Mr Gauci denied ever discussing compensation with the police, although he did admit awareness of the US reward money. He also alleged that former Libyan leader Col Muammar Gaddafi had also offered him a handsome reward, which he refused.

But the compensation issue also cropped up in 1999 in an assessment report by the Scottish police on including Mr Gauci and his brother Paul in a witness protection programme. It speaks of Mr Gauci’s “frustration” and Paul’s pushiness to get some form of compensation for the troubles they endured.

Without delving into the merits of whether talk of compensation could have influenced Mr Gauci’s testimony, the review commission said the information should have been disclosed to the defence. It concluded that the information could have been used to question Mr Gauci’s credibility and put into serious difficulty the prosecution’s case against Mr Megrahi.

But it is in Mr Gauci’s confusion over Mr Megrahi’s identification where the commission feels “a miscarriage of justice” may have occurred.

Pinpointing December 7, 1988 as the day when the clothes sale happened was crucial for the prosecution because it placed Mr Megrahi in Malta. Any other day before this would have exonerated the Libyan.

Mr Gauci’s testimony in this regard is anything but clear. The only consistent recollection is that on the day he was alone at the shop because his brother Paul was at home watching football.

The only football matches on TV at the time would have been transmitted on RAI, the Italian state television, and would possibly have been linked to European club football matches, putting the day down to a Wednesday.

The prosecution was dilly-dallying between December 7, a Wednesday, and a second day, November 23 – also a Wednesday. But Mr Gauci had also spoken of seeing Christmas decorations “being put up” in the street “a fortnight before Christmas”.

Subsequent research by the defence team, which was never used in the appeal for tactical reasons, revealed that in that year Christmas lights were lit up by then Tourism Minister Michael Refalo on December 6, which means the lights had been “put up” in the preceding weeks.

The court had believed Mr Gauci’s version, even if not solid, as pointing towards December 7 and so incriminating Mr Megrahi.

However, after considering all the evidence before the court on this matter, the review commission concluded there was “no reasonable basis” for the conclusion that the purchase took place on December 7.

The only evidence which favours that date over November 23, the commission said, was Mr Gauci’s account that the purchase must have been about a fortnight before Christmas and his confused description of the Christmas lights going up at the time.

“In light of the difficulties with those two pieces of evidence the commission does not consider that a reasonable court, properly directed, could have placed greater weight upon them than upon evidence of the weather conditions and of Mr Gauci’s statements – in which he said that the purchase had taken place in “November, December 1988”, “November or December 1988” and “at the end of November”. In the commission’s view, those factors taken together point, if anything, to a purchase date of November 23.”

But another question mark hangs over Mr Gauci’s visual identification of the bombing suspect and his early description in police statements of the Libyan as a man, aged “about 50” and of a height that is “about six foot or more”.

In December 1988 Mr Megrahi was 36 years old and measured five feet eight inches, marked discrepancies from Mr Gauci’s man.

But Mr Gauci had consistently, on various occasions in 1989 and 1990, when shown photos of potential suspects by the police, identified two different people: Abo Talb and Mohammed Salem.

It was only in February 1991 that Mr Gauci identified Mr Megrahi as the man who bought clothes from his shop but the prosecution rested heavily on an identification parade held in April 1999, in the months before the trial, when Mr Megrahi was officially indicted.

In the Netherlands, Mr Gauci had pointed to Mr Megrahi and in broken English told investigators: “Not exactly the man I saw in the shop. Ten years ago I saw him, but the man who look a little bit like exactly is the number 5.”

The commission noted that an “extraordinary length of time” had passed between the date of purchase and the parade but of more significance was the fact that prior to the parade Mr Gauci was exposed to Mr Megrahi’s photograph in Focus magazine. This “raises doubts as to the reliability of Mr Gauci’s identification” of Mr Megrahi at that time, the commission said.

It did note though that in February 1991, there was no risk of Mr Gauci being influenced by media exposure of Mr Megrahi since no indictments had been issued yet.

“However, like those other identifications, the identification by photograph in 1991 was one of resemblance only and was qualified and equivocal.”

The commission concluded that in the absence of “a reasonable foundation for the date of purchase” and bearing in mind “the problems with Mr Gauci’s identification” of Mr Megrahi, it was of the view that “no reasonable trial court could have drawn the inference” that the Libyan was the buyer of the clothes.

The significance of this conclusion, the commission said, lay in the fact that such a finding “might be capable of undermining” the weight of other evidence against Mr Megrahi such as that relating to his presence at Luqa airport on the morning of December 21, 1988.

Investigators had argued that an unaccompanied suitcase carrying the bomb and containing the incriminating clothing was placed on board an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, where it eventually made it to Heathrow before being loaded on to the fatal Pan-Am flight.

Sunday, 26 March 2017

Megrahi scapegoated

[What follows is the text of a column by George Galloway that was published in the Daily Record on this date in 2012:]

I've never believed the Lockerbie verdict that Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was guilty of the Lockerbie bombing in 1988.
Now the long hushed-up, 800-page report on the case by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission has concluded that a miscarriage of justice almost certainly occurred.
The contents of the report had been known to those in the know - the Scottish government, senior lawyers, the dogs in the street even - for more than five years.
It hasn't been published on the spurious grounds that there were data protection issues involved.
I ask, in passing, has anyone ever been convicted under the Data Protection Act?
The report details six different grounds on which Megrahi could have been the victim of a miscarriage of justice. I prefer the words fitted-up.
The whole report is now available on various websites, but basically the conclusion is that crucial evidence was not disclosed to the defence.
This includes a cover-up of secret intelligence ­documents and uncertainty over the date on which Megrahi was supposed to have bought clothes in Malta.
And the fact that the key witnesses against him had been paid £1.9million to testify, and one of the two Maltese brothers had a seen picture of Megrahi stating he was the bomber before he picked him out at an identification parade.
It's right that the report should be belatedly published, the follow-up should be an investigation of those who conspired to have Megrahi scapegoated.

Saturday, 25 March 2017

SCCRC Statement of Reasons published

[What follows is excerpted from a report published in The Guardian on this date five years ago:]

Scotland's Sunday Herald has published a report that was kept secret for years, which could have cleared the convicted Lockerbie bomber, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi.

The Herald gave two reasons for publishing the full 821-page report, by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, on its website.

First, it had obtained al-Megrahi's permission. Second, it believed publication was in the public interest.

Though the Crown Office regards the publication of the document as unauthorised, there were prior indications from senior law officers that the paper would not be prosecuted for doing so.

The Herald would doubtless point out that there is a public interest defence for breaches of the Data Protection Act.

It also ensured the protection of confidential sources and private information by making a number of redactions.

The paper's decision was welcomed by Scottish first minister, Alex Salmond, who had previously called for the grounds for al-Megrahi's appeal to be published.

Al-Megrahi, a Libyan, was convicted for the 1988 bombing - in which 270 people died - and jailed for murder in 2001.

He lost his first appeal and dropped a second shortly before he was released in August 2009 on compassionate grounds.

[RB: The SCCRC Statement of Reasons can be read here.]

Friday, 24 March 2017

The Crown Office and Lockerbie

What follows is an item originally posted on this blog on this date five years ago:

How do you solve a problem like Crown Office?


For at least two-and-a-half years the issue of publication of the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission’s Statement of Reasons in the Megrahi case has been a matter of public and political concern. The Scottish Government first produced a Statutory Instrument The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (Permitted Disclosure of Information) Order 2009 which (so it was said) was intended to facilitate publication. When that, as could have been -- and was -- widely anticipated, did not have the desired(?) effect, the Scottish Government introduced the Criminal Cases (Punishment and Review)(Scotland) Bill which is currently before the Scottish Parliament. This is also so hedged about with conditions that publication of anything useful under it is in the highest degree unlikely.

But wait! All of this fevered activity was completely unnecessary.  All that needed to happen was for the Lord Advocate to grant to the SCCRC immunity from prosecution under section 194J of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, the provision which makes it a criminal offence for the SCCRC to publish its reports.This the Lord Advocate did yesterday.  If, as we have been assured from the outset, the Crown Office and the Scottish Government devoutly wished the Megrahi Statement of Reasons to be published, why was this step not taken long ago?

This is yet another indication that something is very seriously amiss at the top of the Crown Office, as is the disinformation that the Crown Office is now assiduously disseminating.

With apologies to Rodgers and Hammerstein:

How do you solve a problem like Crown Office?
How do you catch a cloud and pin it down?
How should you describe Crown Office?
A flibbertijibbet!  A will-o'-the wisp!  A clown!

Many a thing you know you'd like to tell it,
Many a thing it really ought to see.
But how do you make it stay
And listen to all you say
When deaf and blind it chooses now to be?

Oh, how do you solve a problem like Crown Office
To make it fit to work for you and me?

Thursday, 23 March 2017

A welcome departure

[What follows is an item posted on this date in 2016 on Dr Jim Swire and Peter Biddulph’s Lockerbie Truth website:]

Scotland's Lord Advocate [Frank Mulholland] is to step down from his position as Scotland's leading law officer. Click here for more…

His decision comes just days after a media conference held in Edinburgh's Dynamic Earth conference centre on 16th March, chaired by representatives of Justice for Megrahi.

At that conference there were calls for the Lord Advocate to consider his position, following a special police investigation - Operation Sandwood - into allegations of criminality [by police and prosecutors] and a key forensic witness during the Lockerbie trial of Libyan Baset al-Megrahi.

It is understood that the Operation Sandwood report will be available for consideration in approximately two months time. [RB: It is now expected later this year. Justice for Megrahi's liaison group has regular meetings with the investigation team and is confident about the rigour of the complex investigation.]

Recently in an unusual move, the National Scottish Police Force has appointed an independent QC to advise it on the Sandwood inquiry because it felt unable to ask Crown Office lawyers to assess the evidence of alleged wrongdoing against certain Crown officers.  Click here for more on this story.

Al-Megrahi was convicted in 2000 for the Lockerbie bombing, in which 259 passengers and eleven townspeople were killed by a bomb placed on flight Pan Am 103.

[RB: Frank Mulholland QC was installed as a judge of the Court of Session and High Court of Justiciary on 15 December 2016. His disgraceful comments about Justice for Megrahi’s criminality allegations gravely compromised the Crown Office’s position in relation to Operation Sandwood.]

Wednesday, 22 March 2017

Gaddafi hails Libya Lockerbie "victory" at UN

[This is the headline over a report that appeared on the BBC News wbsite on this date in 1998. It reads as follows:]

Libyan leader Col Muammar Gaddafi has expressed his thanks to the many countries which expressed support at the UN debate this weekend over ending the sanctions imposed against Tripoli for the Lockerbie disaster, and said Tripoli had won both the legal and political battle over the case.

"On behalf of all the Libyan men and women, I extend my warmest thanks to the friendly and brotherly countries, the UN members and to the International Court of Justice, the main legal instrument of the world.
I also thank the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement," Gaddafi said in a speech broadcast on Sunday on Libyan TV.

Gaddafi said he was addressing "all the speakers who took the floor yesterday at the Security Council".

"On behalf of the Libyan people and all the peoples who are convinced that the strength of law will prevail over the law of force, I extend to them my thanks, respect and gratitude," Gaddafi said.

"The Libyan people received massive support for their just cause and their confrontation against the forces of injustice represented by Britain.

I would like to express this gratitude for this world support which I regard as the support of the century for a small country in its confrontation against superpowers which are coveting our wealth." Gaddafi went on:

"Yesterday there was an international trial in which, principally Britain and America were in the dock. World states made accusations against these two states.

"We, Libyans, won the legal battle at the International Court of Justice, and yesterday night we won the political battle at the Security Council when a third of the organization's members, who were able to speak, spoke.

“Perhaps the other two thirds would have spoken in support of Libya.
When they spoke, they supported the Libyan stance, the Libyan policy and the Libyan people," Gaddafi said.

"What did the ICJ say? It said that the Lockerbie incident - Pan Am flight 103 - was a legal and not a political case. This is the first ruling. It is a criminal case which does not concern the Security Council. It said that it came under the Montreal Convention and not under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Therefore, the resolutions which were literally imposed on the Security Council against the Great Jamahiriyah under Chapter 7 are unlawful under the ruling of the ICJ.

"The falsification, which we rebelled, demonstrated and protested against at the time, has become evident. Now, God be praised, it is being confirmed by the ICJ. It confirms the falsification of the claim that international security was under threat," Gaddafi said.

Tuesday, 21 March 2017

Lockerbie questions for the FBI

What follows is an article originally posted on this blog on this date in 2012.

What the SCCRC should have asked the FBI


[This is the heading over an item posted today by John Ashton on his Megrahi: You are my Jury website.  It reads as follows:]

On 18 March Scotland on Sunday ran an article headlined Megrahi probe ‘failed to speak to FBI agents’, which reported criticisms of the SCCRC by FBI officers Oliver ‘Buck’ Revell and Richard Marquise. [RB: See here and here.]

It states:  Oliver “Buck” Revell, the former associate deputy director of investigations for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, has reacted angrily to the examination into the case by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC). In an e-mail seen by Scotland on Sunday, Revell expressed frustration that no-one from the FBI was consulted by the SCCRC when it compiled its report into the safety of Megrahi’s conviction … In his e-mail to government and legal officials in Scotland and the US, Revell complained that the SCCRC failed to interview members of the FBI for its Statement of Reasons. The e-mail pointed out that the original Lockerbie investigation was carried out by Scottish police, Scotland Yard, the German BKA and the FBI. Revell added: “I don’t know what the SCCRC expects to determine when it is not even interviewing the actual investigators involved in solving this terrible crime.”
Marquise said:  “I don’t know if you can say you have done a comprehensive report unless you speak to key people. To me it is an incomplete report whatever they are going to publish. They never did speak to the people who might be able to shed some light on whatever it is that they were looking to find out. If you are going to say you have done a complete investigation, you should talk to everybody who was key, and I like to think people in the FBI were key. I like to think some people in the CIA were key and they could and should have been interviewed.”
While neither man shed any light on what the FBI investigators could have told the commission, we might infer from their comments that the Bureau held further evidence of Abdelbaset’s guilt. Of course, it almost certainly didn’t, because any such evidence would have been handed to the Crown.
That said, I share Revell’s and Marquise’s disappointment that the SCCRC failed to interview anyone from the FBI, as many important questions remain unanswered. For example:
1. What did FBI agent John Hosinski discuss with Tony Gauci when he met him alone on 2 October 1989?
2. What did Senegalese official Jean Collin reveal when interviewed in the US in December 1990?
3. Was the content of Collin’s interview revealed to the Scottish police? And, if not, why not?
4. Why did the FBI’s Tom Thurman ‘front’ for the CIA in relation to the identification of the timer fragment?
5. According to FBI agent Hal Hendershot, Thurman had a laboratory in Lockerbie within days of the bombing. What forensic work did he undertake and was that work shared with the Scottish investigators?
6.When, in June 1990, Thurman demonstrated to the Scottish police that PT/35b matched the control sample MST-13 timer, why did he not reveal that he was already aware that the timers were made by Mebo?
7. Why was Hendershot aware of the contents of the Toshiba manual fragment PK/689 before it was examined for the Scottish police at RARDE?
8. Why was the FBI able to investigate debris item PI/1389 (a blue T-shirt, which, according to the FBI’s Bonn legal attache David Keyes, showed blast damage and the imprint of the grills of two radio speakers) before RARDE?
9. What information did Hendershot, Thurman and Bob Howen uncover in relation to the crystals used in the MST-13 timers? In particular, were they able to establish the date of manufacture of the crystal used in the control sample timer K-1, which was recovered from Togo and which Thurman used for comparative purposes with the fragment PT/35b?
10. Regarding the episode at Frankfurt airport, witnessed by FBI agent Lawrence Whittaker and DI Watson McAteer, in which a baggage handler apparently entered a bag into the automated transit system without recording the transaction, why was Whittaker’s trial testimony at odds with McAteer’s statement S3743A?
11. How many FBI FD302 reports by Lockerbie field agents were handed to the Crown? (Only a handful were provided to the defence.)
12. The US Department of Justice has stated that only three reports were produced in relation to the FBI’s inquiries in Malta. Given the centrality of Malta to the case, why were there so few?
Perhaps Mr Revell and Mr Marquise can answer these questions.
The article is also notable for the following quote by Marquise:  “On the issue of witnesses being paid, no witness [was paid] to my knowledge. What some police officer or FBI agent might have told somebody in the corner in a dark room in the middle night that I don’t know about, I can’t vouch for that. But everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get money for this case. So, as far as I know, nobody was promised or paid money to testify.”

The SCCRC report states, at paragraph 23.19:  Enquiries with D&G [Dumfries and Galloway Police] have established that, some time after the conclusion of the applicant’s appeal against conviction, Anthony and Paul Gauci were each paid sums of money under the “Rewards for Justice” programme administered by the US Department of State. Under that programme the US Secretary of State was initially authorised to offer rewards of up to $5m for information leading to the arrest or conviction of persons involved in acts of terrorism against US persons or property worldwide. The upper limit on such payments was increased by legislation passed in the US in 2001.
According to DCI Harry Bell’s diary, on 28 September 1989, FBI agent Chris Murray told Bell that he (Murray): ‘had the authority to arrange unlimited money for Tony Gauci and relocation is available. Murray states that he could arrange $10,000 immediately.’  Murray would not have said these things unless he believed that the offer might have been put to Gauci, yet, according to Marquise, “everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get money for this case.” So, was Murray acting against Marquise’s orders? And, if so will he be held to account? Again, maybe Marquise and Revell can enlighten us.